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ATTORNEY FEES
Whopays thepiper ifyou cut into the dance?
by BarbaraJ. Fick




Argument Date: April25, 1989
The parties to a lawsuit are normally confined to the
plaintiff and defendant. Sometimes, however, the issues
raised In a lawsuit and its possible disposition could affect
the interests of absent third parties. In such circumstances,
these third parties seek to intervene In the lawsuit to protect
their interests. Such intervention can have the consequence
of prolonging the litigation and increasing its cost to the
parties involved.
The general rule in this country Is that each party bears its
own costs In litigation, including the payment of attorney
fees. There are some exceptions to this rule, particularly In
the field of civil rights litigation, where Congress has statutor-
ily provided that courts may require unsuccessful litigants to
pay the prevailing party's attorney fees.
There are well-developed guidelines to assist courts In
allocating attorney fees between plaintiffs and defendants. It
Is not so clear what standard should be used In assessing fees
against an Intervener.
ISSUE
This case raises the question of what standard the courts
should apply in deciding whether to assess attorney fees
against an unsuccessful intervener in federal employment
discrimination cases.
FACTS
TWA had a policy of terminating all flight attendants who
became mothers. The Airline Stewards and Stewardesses
Association, the union representing the flight attendants,
filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of the terminated flight
attendants, challenging the policy as constituting unlawful
sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
Subsequently, ALSSA and TWA entered into a settlement
agreement which provided that TWA would discontinue its
policy and offer reinstatement to the next available opening
to all attendants discharged pursuant to the policy, with
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seniority as of the date of discharge. The settlement did not
provide for back pay or retroactive seniority. The 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the district court's approval of the
settlement, finding ALSSA to be an inadequate class repre.
sentative due to the conflict of interest between the class
members and the incumbent employees of TWA.
On remand, ALSSA was removed as class representative
and replaced by individual class members. The district court
held that TWA's policy violated Title VII and also held that
the claims of all class members were timely filed and,
therefore, that all class members were entitled to a remedy.
The 7th Circuit affirmed the finding of a violation but
reversed the court's holding on the timeliness issue, finding
that TWA has not engaged in a continuing violation and that
Title VII time limits were jurisdictional prerequisites. The
latter finding meant that the claims of approximately 92
percent of the class were time-barred and therefore these
individuals were not entitled to a remedy.
Certiorari petitions were filed with the Supreme Court;
the Court granted a joint motion to defer consideration of the
petitions pending settlement negotiations between the par-
ties. In settlement, TWA set up a $3 million fund from which
class members would receive back pay and the attorney fees
for the class would be paid. TWA also agreed to reinstate all
class members as vacancies occurred, with retroactive senior-
ity from their original dates of hire.
A notice of the settlement agreement was sent to the
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, the successor
union to ALSSA. IFFA intervened in the lawsuit and objected
to the settlement on the grounds that the grant of retroactive
seniority would adversely impact on incumbent employees'
seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement,
and that the district court lacked the authority to approve a
settlement of the claims of those class members whose
chargej were untimely.
The district court rejected the IFFA's objections and
approved the settlement. The union appealed and the 7th
Circuit affirmed the district court order. The union obtained
certiorari and the Supreme Court granted the previously filed
certiorari petitions which had been held In abeyance pend-
ing settlement.
The Supreme Court ruled that Tide VII time limits were
not jurisdictional prerequisites and could be waived, and
thus that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to
approve the settlement. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines; Inc.,
455 U.S. 385 (1982).
Plaintiffs then sought attorney fees of $1,400,000 from
both TWA and IFFA pursuant to S 706(k) of Title VII, which
provides that a court may award fees to a prevailing party.
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The district court held that under the terms of the settlement
agreement, TWA's liability for attorney fees was limited to
$1,250,000, and assessed an award of $180,915.84 against the
IFFA.
The IFFA appealed the award of fees against it, arguing
that it was not a violator of federl law, and that it should be
considered a "functional plaintiff" for purposes of awarding
fees. Therefore, it.should be held liable for attorney fees only
if its claims were frivolous. The 7th Circuit rejected the
union's argument and affirmed the decision of the district
court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of
the award of attorney fees.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Title VII was passed with the objective of eradicating
employment discrimination and compensating victims of
such discrimination. The enforcement of the Act is largely
dependent on lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs. Con-
gress, recognizing that private individuals, particularly those
who are victims of employment discrimination, often lack
the resources necessary to retain counsel to represent them,
included a provision which allows a court to award attorney
fees to prevailing parties: § 706(k).
In Cbristansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the
intent and application of S 706(k). It held that successful
plaintiffs should ordinarily recover their attorney fees from
unsuccessful defendants in the absence of special circum-
stances that would make such an award unjust. This almost
automatic award of fees to plaintiffs is justified because It
encourages private plaintifl to enforce the statute, and
because the award is assessed against proven violators of
federal law.
The Court then considered under what circumstances, if
any, a successful defendant is entitled to an award of fees.
The Court held that the statutory term "prevailing party" was
not limited to plaintiffs but was broad enough to encompass
successful defendants. However, the factors that justified the
almost automatic award of fees to successful plaintiffs are
absent when the case Involves a successful defendant. There-
fore, successful defendants are not automatically entitled to
an award of attorney fees; they are eligible only if the
plaintiff's case was frivolous, unreasonable or without
foundation.
The issue raised by this case concerns the standard to be
used in determining an unsuccessfut intervener's liability for
the plaintiffs attorney fees. Should an unsuccessful interven-
er be viewed as equivalent to the unsuccessful defendant
who is almost automatically liable for fees, or to the unsuc-
cessful plaintiff who Is liable only if his case is frivolous?
While this case arises under Title VII, its outcome will
have ramifications for parties involved in litigation arising
under a number of federal statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is
substantially identical to S 706(k), and any interpretation of
S 706(k) will be applied to cases involving S 1988. Section
1988 governs the award of attorney fees in cases alleging civil
rights' violations by state and local governments, in cases
alleging racial discrimination by private citizens in the mak-
ing of contracts or the sale or lease of property, and in cases
alleging discrimination in federally assisted programs. The
fee shifting provisions of the Clean Air Act and the Fair
Housing Act are also substantially identical to S 706(k).
Parties intervene in litigation when they have an interest
in the subject matter of the litigation and the disposition of
the case may affect that interest. Should the Court apply the
"almost automatic" standard to unsuccessful interveners, this
could deter parties from protecting their interests through
intervention. This could encourage parties to file separate
lawsuits to protect their interests, so as to gain the advantage
of being considered a plaintiff for purposes of fee-shifting,
thus leading to duplicitous litigation.
Moreover, in civil rights cases, remedies ordered by a
court often affect the rights of individuals not parties to the
case. Deterring intervention not only adversely impacts on
these individuals' decision to protect their rights, but also
impairs the court's ability to render a just decision, since it
will remain uninformed about the ramifications of its deci-
sion on the rights of others, having heard only two sides in a
multi-sided dispute.
On the other hand, adopting the "frivolous" standard
could deter plaintiffs from vindicating their rights, contrary to
congressional reliance on private parties for enforcement of
civil rights laws. The disposition of civil rights cases tends to
affect broad classes of people, and plaintiffs know that in
vindicating their rights, they will often have to defend the
remedies achieved from attacks by third-party Interveners.
If plaintiffs are unable to recover the attorney fees they
expended due to the prolongation or obstruction of litiga-
tion caused by interveners, plaintiffs may decide that it is not
worth the effort to enforce their rights when any monetary
recovery may be eaten up by attorney fees, or where the
payment of such fees leaves them worse off than before
litigation.
ARGUMENGS
For the Indenddent Feeradon of ftbt Atendn
(Counsel of Record, Steven A Febr, Jolley, Walsb, Hager &
Gordon, 204 West LUnwood Boulevard, Kansas City, MO
64111; telephone (816)561-3755):
1. The policy considerations that justify the almost automat-
ic award of attorney fees against unsuccessful defendants
are inapplicable to interveners. Plaintiffs who cannot
recover attorney fees from Interveners will still have an
Incentive to bring lawsuits because they can expect to
recover a substantial portion of their fees from defen-
dants. Unlike unsuccessful defendants, interveners have
not violated federal law but have merely sought to protect
their rights.
2. The appropriate standard to adopt in dealing with inter-
veners who are not responsible for violations of federal
law is to treat them as functional plaintiffs who are not
assessed fees unless their claims are frivolous, unreason-
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able or without foundation.
3. The procedural posture of the parties, particularly In a
multi.sided dispute, should not be determinative of the
standard of liability for attorney fees. The courts should
look beyond litigation labels and determine the individ-
ual parties' relation to the issues involved in the lawsuit.
Looked at in this manner, IFFA's relation to the issues
raised is more akin to that of a plaintiff than a defendant.
4. It is the defendants' violation of the law that triggers
lawsuits in the first place and necessitates Intervention by
third parties. Assessing fees against unsuccessful but
Innocent interveners unfairly allows unsuccessful defen-
dants who are guilty of violating federal law to shift the
burden of litigation costs that are direcdy attributable to
their wrongdoing.
5. Almost automatically assessing fees against unsuccessful
interveners will result in a chilling effect whereby third
parties may forego asserting their rights.
6. In the circumstances of this case, to assess fees against the
IFFA would punish the union for performing an act it was
required to do. The settlement agreement between plain-
tiffs and TWA explicitly provided that it would supersede
IFFA's collective bargaining agreement, and in granting
retroactive seniority to class members, It adversely impact-
ed on seniority rights of incumbent employees under the
collective bargaining agreement. The IFFA, as the bar-
gaining representative of the Incumbent employees, was
obliged by its duty of fair representation to enforce the
employees' contractual rights.
7. Even if the Court were to apply the almost automatic
standard, special circumstances exist In t.is case which
make the award of fees against IFFA unjust.
For Anne B. Zpes, et aL (Counsel of Record, Aram A
Hartunan, Hartunlan, Futterman & Howard, Ctd, Suite
1850, 122 Soutb Michigan Ave., Chicago, IL 60603; tele-
phone (312) 427-3600):
1. The purpose of S 706(k) is to ensure that private plaintiffs,
upon whom enforcement of Title VII largely depends,
could attract and compensate competent counsel. Coun-
sel expends major effort obtaining and defending remedi-
al orders issued In these cases. An inability to receive fee
awards for this work, solely because It Is caused by
challenges filed by interveners rather than defendants,
would discourage counsel from accepting these cases,
contrary to congressional intent.
2. The award of fees is based on the concept of which party
prevails, not who violated the law. The purpose of fee-
shifting Is compensatory, not punitive. It is intended to
ensure that parties who litigate in the public interest will
not be forced to bear the cost of'litigation; it is not
intended to punish violators of the law. Whether or not an
intervener is innocent of a violation of law is not the
determinative factor in awarding fees.
3. The language and purpose of§ 706(k) evince no basis for
exempting interveners from liability for attorney fees.
4. The role played by the IFFA in this case was not that of a
functional plaintiff. The IFFA was not seeking redress for
a violation of its rights under Title VII. The union was
challenging not only the retroactive seniority provisions
but the entire settlement, and in doing so was reasserting
a jurisdictional challenge to the lawsuit that the defen-
dant had abandoned.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of The Independent Federaion of Flight
AAendant&
The EEOC, the International Association of Fire Fighters
and the Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund. The
latter group asserted an additional argument in support of
the IFFA's position, arguing that fee awards against non-
liable interveners violate the rights of those parties to litigate
as a means of political expression, and that therefore such
awards impermissibly infringe on First Amendment free
speech rights.
In suport ofAnne B. Zipes, et aL
The American Civil Liberties Union and the American
Civil Liberties Union of Illinois argued that S 706(k) by its
terms leaves the decision regarding the award of attorney
fees to the district court's discretion, and thus no absolute
rule for interveners Is appropriate. Rather, the courts have
been given the authority to award fees to prevailing parties
when they determine it is appropriate. In making this deter-
mination with regard to interveners, courts should consider
whether the Intervener obstructed or prolonged the litiga-
tion, the expenses created for the plaintiff as a result of the
intervention, and any other special circumstances.
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